Author: Aditya Hiremath is a third-year student at Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur with a keen interest in securities and commercial law.
The object of labour legislation is, above all, to further the cause for social justice – in line with the constitutional ethos of India. The case of Roshan Deen presents a peculiar and undesirable situation wherein which the high court erred gravely in deciding upon pronouncing a judgment in direct contradiction to labour legislation (Section 17 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923) whilst being oblivious to an apparent fraud played on the court. The supreme court’s necessary intervention in this case exemplifies its role as the guardian of rights of the people. This piece seeks to provide a background to the case and analysis of the same followed by a look into international precedent on similar cases, and a descriptive analysis of the duties of the courts to prevent any injustice that may be meted out to people, along with a comparison to the object of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 in light of relevant judgments.
1) Background
The applicant in this case had suffered various injuries on account of an accident that took place in a flour mill-cum-sugarcane factory. While operating a particular machine, his body got caught in the shaft, resulting in his body getting crushed by the machinery. He had been in a severely debilitated condition – he had suffered injuries to various body parts leading to him requiring one leg and one hand to be amputated, apart from an emergency tracheotomy. This constituted ‘permanent total disablement’ as provided for under Section 2 (l). A case was filed before the Commissioner seeking compensation amounting to Rs. 7 lakhs. However, the respondent denied all claims, stating that the applicant had never been his employee. Later, an application was filed stating that the applicant wished to withdraw all of his claims for compensation. The document purportedly contained the signature of the respondent and the thumb impression of the applicant. The commissioner, in furtherance of having accepted such a document, dismissed the claims as having been settled. However, subsequently, the applicant further approached the commissioner, stating that he was completely unaware of the application for withdrawal of suit proceedings and that he had been fraudulently made to believe by his advocate that he should affix his thumb impression on the document and receive a paltry sum of Rs 9500, in accordance with the commissioner’s decision. Realising that a fraud had been played on him, the commissioner recalled his decision, allowing the case to be decided in accordance with Section 17 instead. The respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court under Article 227. The single- judge bench ruled that there had been no element of fraud and in clear ignorance of Section 17 of the 1923 Act, reinstated the earlier order of the commissioner that stated that settlement had been arrived at. The applicant, aggrieved by the High Court’s decision, preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Judgment
The court allowed the appeal and noted that the High Court had erred on numerous fronts, acting in ignorance of special legislation meant for social welfare, and misusing its powers under Article 227 by passing an order that further disadvantaged the life of an already crippled man. The court set aside the order of the High court and reinstated the second order of the commissioner, which had stated that the case be tried on merits in accordance with Section 17. The court also took cognizance of the ruling in “United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh” which stated that it is not outside of the powers of any court to recall an order made by it previously if it is later found out that new facts have emerged revealing that the very basis of the case had been compromised on account of fraud.
2) Critical Analysis
2.1) Judgement Obtained by Fraud in Light of International Precedent
It was stated by Lord Denning in “Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley” that “no judgement of a court, no order of a minister can be allowed to stand if it is obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything.”
“Tommey v. White” is another example of a case wherein the House of Lords held that its previous judgement could be set aside by itself should it be found out later that such judgement was obtained through fraudulent means.
Lord Cottenham in Bowen v. Owens, stated that “if a case of fraud is established, Equity will set aside all transactions founded upon it, by whatever machinery they may have been effected, and notwithstanding any contrivances by which it may have been attempted to protect them.”
Thus, it may be observed that common law systems across international jurisdictions strongly express their disapprobation towards fraud played on the court in order to receive a more favourable judgement. Such actions, if allowed, would violate the very spirit and object of the judicial system.
2.2) Myopic and Inequitable Order of the High Court
The High Court seems to have blatantly ignored the legislative intent behind not only Section 17 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (which provides that employers may not be allowed to contract themselves out of any liability to pay compensation for legitimate claims made by workmen) but also Section 151 and 153 of the CpC that allows courts to review their judgements in cases wherein there might otherwise have been an abuse of justice. In the case of Badami v. Bhali, the Supreme Court ruled that “any decree obtained on account of playing fraud would be declared a nullity”. It has been observed by courts time and time again that fraud vitiates every solemn act. It may be easily concluded that no end of justice is served if a judicial decision is obtained through misconduct. It is in this light that it may be concluded that the single judge bench has erred greatly in delivering a judgement that was blatantly unjust when it had been clear that there had been prima facie, an element of fraud employed by the respondent employer.
2.3) The Duties of the Judiciary – No person should suffer Injustice on account of the Actions of the Court
The Supreme Court in the case of “HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Union of India”[i] dealt with a matter wherein the right to privacy had not been considered adequately while considering a matter concerning the right to information. It ruled that no one must suffer due to a mistake of the court and that the court, once it becomes cognizant of its mistake, not only can but must rectify such mistake in the interest of justice.
The Supreme Court reiterated the observations of the Malimath committee on judicial reforms in the case of “A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam” that in order to achieve the ideal of justice, truth must prevail. In light of the fraud played on the commissioner by the respondent in Roshan Deen,an unjust decision must not be allowed to stand.
In “Govt. of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi”, the Supreme Court categorically ruled that the courts must play “an activist role” in guarding the fundamental rights and liberties of the people. In the case of Roshan Deen, the applicant suffered a great deal of physical and emotional pain on account of the accident, rendering him a crippled man with a substantially lower earning capacity, if any at all. The man miraculously escaped what could have resulted in certain death. He deserves an existence greater than that of mere physical existence or survival – that of human dignity. The appropriate compensation, had it been awarded by the high court to the applicant, would have gone a long way in enabling the applicant to afford the means necessary for a decent life. In light of the legislative intent behind Section 17, it was incumbent on the high court to do what was necessary to uphold social justice – which is the aim of the legislation. However, the High Court has miserably failed at that.
2.4) The Object of The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 in Light of Relevant Case Laws
Upon a reading of the facts of the case, it is evident that the injuries sustained by Mr. Roshan were nothing short of “total permanent disablement”. The very description of the Employee’s Compensation Act spells out that the objective of the legislation is to mandate certain employers to provide compensation to their employees in cases wherein they suffer injuries at their workplace by accident. Although the Supreme Court had to deal with the principal issue of whether a person was entitled to receive compensation under both the ECA, 1923, as well as the ESIA, 1948, in “Associated Electrical Agencies v. Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation”, it reiterated that the objective of the 1923 Act was to provide compensation to workers who suffer injuries by accident. The same was also reiterated in the case of “State of Maharashtra v. Labour Court & Commissioner”[ii]. The court in “Bahai House of Worship v. Munisha”, observed that legislation such as the 1923 act may be termed “beneficial legislation” intended to benefit workmen and that the same must be accommodatively interpreted in order to benefit them. Additionally, the court in “Jaya Biswal v. IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd.”, observed that a reading of the preamble of the act revealed that the objective of the legislation is to secure compensation to the impoverished worker who suffers from injuries on account of accidents incurred in his workplace. It is evident from a reading of relevant judgements as well as legislation that the objective of the legislature had been to ensure social justice by lessening the suffering of those who are truly vulnerable – workers, the vast majority of whom lack the necessary financial means and support to recover from devastating injuries they may incur in the process of work.
2.5) On Whether the Supreme Court’s Judgement Reflects Socio-economic Tensions
Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud has emphasised time and time again that the role of the country’s apex court is to come to the aid of the people in protecting their individual rights, especially in tough times. The order of the apex court in Roshan Deen reflects its much -needed intervention in a case wherein the judicial system had failed to uphold its role as the protector or great leveller in instances wherein a more powerful and richer employer seeks to exploit his poor, socio-economically disadvantaged employee. It paints the typical picture of the dark side of humanity – one may view the same as revealing the cynical and callous nature of human beings.
3) Conclusion
The Supreme Court exemplified its sacred position as the ultimate guardian of individual rights by rectifying a blatantly unjust decision passed by the High Court. It is observed that law and procedure must not be utilised to maintain an order that is marred with injustice. An already impoverished and struggling worker’s life was further disadvantaged as the respondent employer – acting in concert with the vulnerable applicant’s lawyer, attempted to sweep the rug from beneath the worker’s floor by denying the compensation that was rightly owed to him by the employer. The object of a welfare state such as India must always be to ensure that the nation works towards social welfare, especially working towards uplifting the lives of those who are vulnerable, poor, and prone to exploitation. Further, the Supreme Court rightly brought up the issue of the conduct of the applicant’s lawyer -an example of an undesirable stain on the noble profession of law. The court directed the Secretary of the Bar Council of Haryana to take appropriate action (as it deems fit) against the lawyer. It may be concluded that the Supreme Court has upheld its role as the final arbiter or supreme guardian of the fundamental and individual rights of the citizens of India.
[i] HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 627.
[ii] State of Maharashtra v. Labour Court & Commissioner, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 317.
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